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“The only true communication takes place without words.” Such was 
the final statement made at a seminar by one of Japan’s leading philosophic- 
religious scholars.2 It neatly and forthrightly puts what may roughly be 
termed the Buddhist-Eastern view of knowledge and its communication on 
the most fundamental level. As such it calls for some further discussion, 
particularly when it stands vzs-d-vzs Christian-Western attempts to com­
municate on the subject of religion.
I
First we may consider something of the nature of communication in 
the generic sense. It may be broadly defined as the sharing of information, 
intention, or meaning between persons. Two obvious conditioning factors 
should be noted at once:
(1) A common symbol-system, such as a language, or somewhat more 
indirectly, common cultural forms, makes such sharing as easy as possible. 
For it was community which produced communication in the first place; 
that is, communication is essentially an intra-communal sharing. And 
“community” always implies taken-for-granted common values and experi­
ences, which, to use an analogy, put everyone within that community on the 
same communicational wave-length or resonance-frequency. To be sure, a 
language, once the exclusive possession of an organic community, may be 
spread widely abroad. But then the resulting communication becomes very 
superficial, because the depth-dimension of common feeling and assumption 
lessens in direct proportion to the spread of the language.
(2) Obviously also, the “thing” or “physical-object” level of communi­
cation is the easiest of all. It is not difficult to point to some object and 
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indicate one’s desire, dislike or neutrality toward it; nor to learn the thing­
form words of another language which describe color, shape, size, etc. And 
at the other end of the communication spectrum there is also the abstract 
vocabulary used in mathematics, science and to some extent in philosophy, 
in which the impersonal, seemingly non-related conceptual entity can achieve 
a rather painless inter-cultural currency.
Yet even here there are difficulties. With the possible exception of 
certain mathematical and scientific formulations, there is nothing completely 
objective in language, i. e. objective in the sense of having nothing directly 
to do with human existential concern. For as F. R. Tennant long ago pointed 
out in his Philosophical Theology, one must say even of science that it is 
completely anthropic, i.e., pursued for the sake of human purposes, con­
structed with human needs in mind, adapted to human understanding. Its 
objectivity is therefore relative and methodological, not absolute or ulti­
mate.
As for the rest of our communicative process it is obviously a web of 
meaning-feeling subtly interwoven at every turn with the subjective- 
existential life of man. It expresses man’s being as man, his hopes, fears, 
concerns. Not even merely informational items, impersonal and objective 
as they seem, can be completely detached from utility, intention, and ex­
periential overtones and relations. How much more so those experiences, 
truths, beliefs, and concerns which we call “religious;” those which have 
to do with man’s most ultimate concerns as an individual human being 1 
Here the “subjective” factors of the communicative process reach their 
maximum degree.
This then brings us face to face with the problem of ineffability, i.e. 
that inexpressibility in words suggested by the original quotation. And that 
implies the presupposition also of inconceivability, I judge, or “unconceptu- 
ability” if I may coin a bad word; for what can be conceptualized can no 
doubt be expressed in language of some sort. In any case we are here on 
the mystic’s territory. For the mystic is one who tells us most eloquently 
that what he has experienced, the truth that he now knows to be true be­
yond any possible doubt either as to meaning or validity, is beyond all 
description. Like the finger pointing at the moon his words only indicate 
the direction of the experienced reality, but are in no sense like that reality, 
or even descriptive of it. He also maintains that he knows immediately, 
without intermediary of any sort—person, word, sensation, thought, or 
concept. His apprehension of truth is such that all subject-object relation is 
overcome; in the moment of truth’s apprehension he is one with that truth.
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Thus I would call Professor Nishitani’s statement an expression of 
mystical quality, without knowing his view of the matter. And I say it with 
knowledge of Dr. D. T. Suzuki’s recent statement1 that he now repents of 
having called Zen “mystical.” However, I am here not using “mystical” 
in the sense of being puzzle-mysterious, or occult, or necessarily including 
visionary appearances of heavenly beings, but in the sense suggested above 
—direct knowledge (or communication) of truth without any intermediary 
item or process, whose inexpressibility springs out of fullness rather than 
poverty of significance. Thus our opening statement, which I take to be 
characteristically Buddhist, is mystical par excellence.
1 The Eastern Buddhist, September, 1965, p. 124.
But it is not my purpose here to define or discuss mysticism in detail. 
Nor are we yet ready to fully consider the quality of Professor Nishitani’s 
statement about communication. There are some preliminary matters to be 
taken up. First there is to be noted the partial ineffability of all experience. 
Sense experience, for example, such as the sight of blue, the sense of cool­
ness, the taste of salt, can only be partially described either by scientific 
formulation or directly descriptive words. For there is a surplus, a depth of 
experience, which can only be hinted at by words, perhaps evoked by poetry. 
Yet, be it noted, this inner residue is not completely of a wholly-other 
nature, for it can be hinted at, pointed to, evoked by imaginative language, 
and be thereby put into relation to other more externalized forms of ex­
perience.
What then of religious experience? Here, as noted before, the ineffabi­
lity of experience reaches its maximum case, though with perhaps almost 
matching ineffability in the esthetic sphere. In religion the inner dimension 
is predominant, almost exclusive in fact, not only as the context of that 
experience, but often also as its content. Feeling and awareness themselves, 
the subtle overtones or emotional resonances of experience—-whatever the 
object or material of experience—-these are of prime concern. They them­
selves are the phenomena dealt with in religious communication. But here 
too feeling, emotional resonance, and psychic-inner experience are never in 
a total conceptual vacuum. The religious-subjective is nourished by certain 
historical forms, induced by specific mental and physical disciplines, and 
specifically related to other experiences and “outer” realities by some web 




We are now ready to concern ourselves with religious communication 
proper and with the problems therein. And they are many, for not only 
are all the difficulties attendant upon ordinary communication here present, 
but they are intensified and added to by those peculiar to religion itself. 
With the intention of dividing and conquering these difficulties I shall 
separate them into areas or groups.
(1) What is it that religion seeks to communicate?
Here I speak as from within religion, not about it, for the inner view is 
primary to all religious communication, whether faith-communication of, or 
philosophical communication about. And from this view-point we may say 
it is essentially a subjective inward experience of reality that religion, qua 
religion, seeks to communicate. Information, facts, doctrines, history, and 
ritual patterns may be the ostensible content, but in the final analysis these 
are but means to an end; and this end is the communication, indeed the 
impartation of the original (i.e., primordial) religious experience on which 
the religion itself rests. Ritual and devotional exercises more properly 
communicate religion in this sense, than do doctrinal and philosophical 
discussions; for they do not seek to give information but only repeat familiar 
patterns, in the hope that the aboriginal experience of reality which under­
lies them may again be livingly experienced by the participants. Or to put 
the matter very plainly, religious communication, in the sense of the com­
munication o/'religion, is always for the purpose of producing in the receiver 
the foundational experience of a given faith, i. e., confirmation in or conver­
sion to the faith.
(2) What is the mode of religious communication ?
The communication of religion must always be indirect, rather than 
direct. It has to do with evocation rather than information, connotation 
rather than denotation, it aims at apprehension rather than comprehension. 
It is closely analogous to poetic and esthetic communication here. A new 
mood or existential orientation is aimed at, rather than new statements. 
About successful religious communication one says: Ah, now I see; or, I 
see what it (the old truth) means for me, for the first time; I am the sinner 
here spoken of. The Quaker “opening into truth” is to the point here. 
Words serving as instruments for the communication of religion, do so pri­
marily as symbols, that is, by indirection and suggestiveness.
(3) Why is religious communication undertaken ?
This question has been answered already in one way. But here on a 
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deeper level we must ask: Why does one seek to produce a given experience 
in another, i.e., communicate it to him in an existential sense? Just because 
each of us wishes to break through our existential solitude by communi­
cating our inwardness to another? Or the innate desire for “self-expres­
sion”? Or the human desire to recruit another for our cause ? Yes, often, 
so far as individuals are concerned. But the basic religious reason is much 
deeper. The communication of religion is undertaken because the experience 
to be communicated is considered to be of surpassing worth and absolute 
importance. And that it has this absolute quality is precisely what consti­
tutes its religious quality.
Now what has been said in thus speaking? Among other things, that 
the religious experience which is to be communicated to (induced in) others 
is not an experience in a conceptual vacuum, no matter how ineffable its 
content. For evocation of religious experience always takes place in a frame­
work of some sort, through some means. Therefore what is evoked or ex­
perienced is always related to other realities and experiences by definite and 
conceptualized patterns. Connotation proceeds from a denotative base and 
takes place in a denotative context. Not even the intensity or vividness or 
reality-sense of an experience stands completely on its own feet. It is because 
such vividness is in part produced by its context of meaning, and is given 
meaning therein, that it becomes supremely important to share it.
Let me expand and illustrate my meaning. First, all experiences are 
set in a context of culturally conditioned feeling and ideation. Though one 
may speak of some “basic” human experience-forms growing out of common 
human nature and of the human relation to a generally similar environment, 
the existence of a “pure,” i.e., pre-cognitive, pre-evaluative experience com­
mon to all men seems very difficult to identify. Or, if identified, its religious 
value seems to be nil until it is incorporated in a context of religious inter­
pretation. Perhaps indeed Professor Nishitani’s “pure” experience and Dr. 
Suzuki’s “absolute subjectivity”1 are thought to be possible, and desired as 
religiously meaningful, because they spring from a specific religious faith 
(Buddhism) and represent a faith-perspective in terms of that religion, rather 
than a universally available or significant type of religious experience.
1 Ibid., p. 125.
Second, and corollary to this: The inner religious experience always 
ideritifies and consolidates itself as a form of experience by relating itself to 
other experiences and realities by some given conceptual scheme. St. Teresa’s 
high moments of ecstatic contact with Reality were both achieved in the 
context of Catholic theological presuppositions and identified later, upon 
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return to normal states of consciousness, by the same means. Hence she 
termed them experience of “God.” Judging from what has been written of 
Buddhist satori, though it is formless in its experiencing and self-effacingly 
penetrative of all subsequent experience of reality, it is considered to be the 
prime proof or living realization of the truth of Buddhism, a participation 
in Sakyamuni’s Enlightenment, and a realization of Suchness. Even though 
satori as a quality of experience is sometimes generously extended to other- 
than-Buddhist experiences, its basic quality is Buddhist, i.e., connected to 
the rest of experience by Buddhist interpretation.
Third, religious experience by virtue of being considered religious—
i. e., partaking of ultimate reality and expressing intimate concern—is neces­
sarily and inherently compared with other experiences. For an experience 
to be esteemed religious it must partake of the depth of man’s existential 
concern, be life-forming and existence-determining in its importance. And 
in order for it to exercise this religious function, it must be conceived to be 
the most convincing, the most real experience, that one has ever had or can 
have. Or, perhaps better, lest this statement suggest merely a spectacular 
or intense, emotional experience, let it be said that religious experiences are 
those which persuade the experiencer that the reality experienced therein 
is the most fundamental Reality that can be encountered. This is what 
makes satori to be satori, conversion to be conversion, and both of them to 
be profoundly religious. Whatever the outward form of such experiences, 
reality is experienced as Absolute Reality, that Reality in which man lives, 
moves, and has his fundamental being. As such, experience of Reality be­
comes existentially functional and life-organizing, i.e., religious.
The provisional conclusion of our discussion thus far is this: Though 
the ultimate experience of the Ultimate Reality toward which our various 
words and symbols point may well be One and Undifferentiated, beyond 
all words, the only way, short of conversion, by which we can speak to each 
other about our religion, is to speak from our own particular word-symbol 
doorway into the ineffable beyond. For this doorway represents the vantage 
point from which we see, and go forth to experience ultimacy. Thus we 
must examine our respective doorways again to see whether and how our 
concept-determined words about experiences of the Ultimate are both 
reflective of and productive of that experience. That is, there is some danger 
that we may take the decorations on our gateposts themselves to be elements 
of the Eternal Reality, or not recognize in what way our gateway determines 
our experience of that Reality. And sometimes it is easier for an outsider to 
observe another’s gateway than his own. Hence, in the second part of this 
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paper, I turn to some specific Buddhist terms often used with regard to 
ultimates, to examine their possible cultural-traditional presuppositions and 
coloring in the hope of understanding them better, i.e., enabling them to 
communicate something about Buddhism to me.
Ill
To begin with, let me state in five consecutive propositions where, i.e., 
in what kind of conceptual-traditional gateway, the Buddhist stands when 
he makes important statements about ultimate religious matters.
1. He stands within existential inwardness.
I am tempted to use the term “subjectivity,” but I have rejected it 
because of its connotations of subject-object dichotomies which Buddhism 
itself hopes to overcome. What I intend to say by means of “existential 
inwardness” is that Buddhism in its quest of the Ultimate, in common with 
Upanishadic Hinduism, seeks the primary key to life’s fundamental meaning 
within the human psyche, in its conditions, states, and experiences.
2. In consonance with this, Ultimate Reality is often termed Mind-Only 
or Buddha-Mind.
Now I am quite aware that the “mind” spoken of here is no mere 
analogue of ordinary human consciousness; indeed it is often portrayed as 
the annihilation of that subject-object oriented consciousness—hence can 
with equal fitness be called Wo-Mind. But I think it is significant that such 
words as AfzW-Only, Buddha-Mme/, or even No-Mind are used in Buddhism 
to point to the Ultimate Reality. We might put it that the very last words 
the Buddhist saint uses before he achieves unity of consciousness or being 
with the Absolute are “mind-” not “thing-” words; and that when he re­
turns from enlightenment it is such “mind-words” that he uses to com­
municate his Enlightenment to others.
3. Though Reality is thus inwardly rather than outwardly experienced, 
the Reality-Experience does not remain imprisoned within the indivi­
dual psyche.
In Western philosophical terms, Buddhist enlightenment is not soli- 
psistic. It is conceived to be a penetration into Absolute Reality. While 
inclusive of individual psychic reality, it is much greater than that reality 
and quite other than its ordinary-personal manifestation—so much so that 
the latter is called no-self by comparison. Thus the meditational door to 
one’s own withinness leads to the Ultimate Withinness of all things, i.e., 
the seeing of them “as they truly are.”
4. The Ultimate Withinness is what the West calls impersonal, even
97
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
though discovered in the psychic within.
It is different from ordinary conscious personality in two important 
respects. First, its awareness is non-objective, i.e., not of out-there objects 
separated by physical, epistemological, or emotional distance from a within- 
here subject. Its awareness is of one piece, a complete awareness-unity in 
which subject and object inhere in each other without conscious distinction. 
It may be called “pure subjectivity” if we keep in mind that there is no 
“pure objectivity” to be opposed to it; or we may term it “living within 
the inwardness of all things.” Second, and corollary to this, is the conviction 
that “inwardness” is no special respecter of personality as such, but is to be 
found equally in “things”—which after all, in the Buddhist view, are only 
creations of the subject-object level of apprehension.
But a “withinness” that is also found in things, which is perhaps even 
better experienced in things than in separate self-conscious personalized 
awareness—this is an inwardness or subjectivity which can be called No­
Mind as well as Mind-CbzZjy. Perhaps then it should be called the supra­
mental or Supra-Mind. I find Professor Nishitani’s words here most sug­
gestive. He would apply the two terms “personal” and “impersonal” equally 
to the Christian conception of the God-man relation. This relation is 
“personal” in its quality of an existential confrontation that calls for im­
mediate decision of salvational import. Yet it is also “impersonal.”
“. . . but not impersonal in the usual sense of being the opposite of the 
personal. For example, when pantheism thinks of the Universal Life, 
or the productive power of Nature, they are impersonal in the usual 
sense. But when we meet with God’s omnipotence existentially, when 
it presents itself as an iron wall that prevents us from all further move­
ment forwards or backwards, it is not impersonal in the usual sense. 
Rather here appears a totally different point of view with regard to 
“personal” and also with regard to “impersonal.” This should be 
considered, so to speak, as an im-“personally” personal relationship, 
or as a “personally” impersonal relationship.”1
1 “What is Religion?” p. 59.
This, I think, is a very provocative statement of suggestive worth to 
Western theologians. But it is important for our purpose here to note that 
some sense of the personal, or the existential-within, remains as primary in 
this statement. That is, when the inner-personal-subjective is thus trans­
cended, even in its transcendence into a supra-personal category of some 
sort, it remains supra.-mental, supra-personal, supra-subjective, rather than 
non- or anti-mental, personal-subjective. Though transcending the subject­
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object, mental-physical polarities of ordinary experience, it is from the 
subjective-mental pole that such transcendence takes its departure into 
ultimacy.
5. To this we may add the further specification: All Buddhist evaluation 
of religious ultimates stems from, and roots in, a particular type of 
meditation-produced experience called enlightenment—or in its Zen 
form, satori.
In this experience is synthesized the essence and meaning of the 
previous-named four items.
Now what is enlightenment? To discuss it at length would be to detail 
the whole history of Buddhism. Here we shall deal with it narrowly and 
scantily in terms of its psychic quality and religious significance. Th. 
Stcherbatsky writes provocatively with regard to Nirvana, the result of the 
enlightenment experience:
“We will better understand the solution at which Buddha arrived if 
we take into account a specific Indian habit of mind, its idea of Quies­
cence as the only real bliss which life can afford. The Buddhist Saint 
(erya) regards the life of the worldling as an unhappy existence of 
constant turmoil. His aim is to escape from phenomenal life into a 
state of absolute Quiescence, a condition in which all emotion and all 
concrete thought is stopped forever. The means of attaining this 
Quiescence is profound meditation (yogd)M
What does Stcherbatsky intend to say in implying that Buddhist en­
lightenment is essentially yogic? Yoga has extremely varied meanings in 
Hinduism. But Stcherbatsky seems to take “yoga” here to mean a medi­
tative method by which an absolute knowledge-experience or perhaps better, 
a knowledge-experience of the Absolute, is aimed at. The quality of that 
experience, and its Absolute, is that of Absolute Quiescence; timeless, dis­
tinctionless cessation from variety and change. The implications are of 
course monistic—as also specifically affirmed by Stcherbatsky elsewhere in 
the same volume.
Is this characterization of Buddhist Enlightenment, from which all else 
in Buddhism flows, and by which everything is ultimately judged, too easy 
and neat? Methodologically there is great similarity between Buddhist 
meditation and yoga. Both emphasize the focalizing of body-mind forces in 
discipline of total and unified awareness; there is a generally similar cutting 
off of, or sharp reduction of, sense-awareness of the outside world and con­
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centration of attention one-pointedly upon a chosen subject-object; and the 
quietening of body-mind is considered good by both.
If we speak of the goals of the two meditative disciplines, they are also 
strikingly similar. In each an absolute knowledge is aimed at; and it is a 
state of realization, or an existential mode of being here entered into, in 
which deluded self is released from its illusion of separate, narrow being­
hood, into a sense of unity with all Being, or Ultimate Being. So also this 
crowning “knowledge”—or better, wisdom—is absolutely different in kind 
from all the lower and lesser rational knowledges. The Reality discovered 
in both Yoga and Buddhist Enlightenment surpasses all categorical descrip­
tion whatsoever, being beyond time, space, subject-object, good-bad, true- 
false characterizations. So too in both instances the final illumination is a 
discovery of the essential “divinity” of the human self—either that Atman 
is Brahman or one’s original nature is the Buddha Nature. Thus considered 
it is almost impossible to distinguish between the realization of Hindu 
Brahman and Buddhist Suchness.
But here we must also note important, and perhaps crucial, differences. 
If both experiences represent the achievement of “unity” with the Ultimate, 
and that Ultimate (Brahman or Suchness-Nirvana) is “monistic” as Stcher- 
batsky maintains, then both “monism” and “unity” must be carefully 
qualified in the case of Buddhism. There is here no merging of substances 
into a Super-Substance which monolithically and monochromatically blots 
out all individual difference.1 If, for no other reason, this is the case, because 
for Buddhism “self” is no substance or separate entity, but a potency in 
relation to other potencies-in-relation—including thing-selves as well as 
person-selves. Further, Mahayana sets the absolute reality of each parti­
cular entity over against its absolute emptiness (or relativity) and stoutly 
maintains the reality-emptiness of each item. Thus the Buddhist “non-self” 
is cherished in all its integrity as jealously as the Christian cherishes his 
“soul.” It is not something to be merged into, or lost in, either another 
particular or in universal Nirvana or Suchness!
1 Cf. "Review Article”, Masao Abe, The Eastern Buddhist, September 1965, 
p. 115.
Thus Mahayana cherishes the world of particularity as opposed to a 
monolithic monism. The Bodhisattva descends from non-determined, in­
describable Suchness into the phenomenal world of particulars over and 
over again, thus sanctifying and blessing them. Each thing in itself becomes 
precious as it-is-in-itself, without judgmental denigration or exaggeration. 
Each particular is equally the bearer of indefinable Suchness and individua­
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lized uniqueness. So it is that Mahayana states that Nirvana is Samsara, 
and that manyness and oneness are the same. And thus it is that as Zen 
especially emphasizes, all of reality may be concentrated in any act—even 
the drinking of a cup of tea1—and into every act in the enlightened life.
1 D. T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series, Harper and Brothers, 
1949, p. 265.
Is this then a genuine modification of, or even a contradiction of the 
yogic drive to the Quiescent Unity of monism described by Stcherbatsky ? 
That it is a modification there can be no doubt—at least in the form of 
expression. Here in Mahayana there is a revaluation of the phenomenal 
life as being significantly the embodiment and manifestation of the nou- 
menal, even and especially in its diverse particularity. Enlightenment is not 
a trance-state to be repeatedly returned to as to a heavenly refuge for its 
own sweet sake; but it is the basis for, indeed the mode of, a genuine, 
awakened re-involvement in the phenomenal world. Compassion flows out 
again from realized suchness into individuality, rather than the droplet of 
individuality losing itself in the ocean of universality.
Yet Stcherbatsky has a genuine point to make with which I agree in 
the main, if not absolutely. For despite all qualification, the balance in 
Buddhism is still tipped toward the timeless, the unconditioned, the quies­
cent, the unitive—though more subtly and indirectly so than in yoga, as 
Stcherbatsky interprets it. Dualism of any sort—subject-object, good-bad, 
true-false, noumenal-phenomenal, psychological-ontological—is the prime 
evil of man’s lot, his “original sin.” And the inmost gate that opens to En­
lightenment is the realization of the irreality, non-existence, or merely 
imaginal reality of individuality as such. So too the highest, the absolute 
Reality of all realities is to be found on the Dharmakaya plane (Nirvana, 
Voidness, distinctionless Suchness), not on the historical-individual plane of 
Nirmanakaya, in the historical-personal manifestation of Buddhahood. In­
deed on almost every page of Mahayana writing the reality of individuality 
is persistently and subtly undermined—inevitably in the direction of a 
monistic Suchness of non-individuality.
Now if it be said that after Enlightenment, one (a bodhisattvic indivi­
dual) returns to the “world” and fully accepts the reality and preciousness 
of all particulars, it must be replied that this acceptance is now detached 
and devalued. For the bodhisattvic mind has first and primarily realized 
the irreality (imaginal reality) of all particulars, including and especially the 
empirical self. And such passion as the bodhisattvic awareness has, is 
precisely the compassionate desire to save particulars from their mere parti­
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cularity. Thus we have the good life lived among particulars as sub specie 
aeternitatis, one of detached compassionateness, of samsara nirvanically 
lived, not concerned involvement. And though there may not be a mergent 
monism of substance, there is a relational monism of irreal particulars non- 
particularly related in non-individual Suchness. Or to state it conversely: 
There is a non-discriminative cherishing of all existent particulars as of 
equal reality and worth, thus devaluing each separate particular by a non- 
evaluative, non-judgmental “monism” of Absolute Equality. And both are 
the end result of Yoga-derived mystic-intuitional realization of Ultimate 
Oneness.
IV
With this preparation we now turn to those most Buddhist of all words 
by which the Ultimate Real is designated. I do not say “describe,” for this 
is in opposition to the central Buddhist conviction of the non-conceptuability 
of ultimates. And the words which it actually uses are as near “non-words” 
as one can come, namely sunyata (translated Void, Emptiness, Nothingness) 
and tathnto. (translated Suchness or Thatness),—and by implication, Nirvana, 
or gone-outness. Now some of these words embody sea-changes in trans­
lation, I believe. And I would also maintain that though such words, as good 
symbols, point beyond themselves, they bear clearly on their faces these 
marks of their contextual origin that are important in our estimation of 
their significance.
These terms originate in the Enlightenment experience, ultimately. 
And therefore they, like that experience and its quality of awareness, are 
paradoxical in that they join radical negativity of concept with radical 
positivity of experience and sense of reality. Methodologically and concep­
tually that experience, and these “non-words”, are completely negative. 
For, as already noted, enlightenment or satori experience are arrived at by 
abstraction from multiple sense-stimuli and by concentration upon some 
sense-neutral object such as the kasina, or concept-neutral object such as a 
koan. Since the method abstracts from conceptualizable content, the resultant 
awareness-object is likewise inevitably described in terms of concept-neutral 
emptiness or nothingness.
But, as Buddhism has always insisted in one way or another and as 
Westerners have always found difficult to apprehend (in part because of 
mistranslations), this negativity of conceptual content is not an existential 
Nullity, Annihilation, or Mere Zero. It is contrarily a fullness that overflows 
all possible descriptive terms. In a well-known passage Rudolf Otto has set 
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forth the existential fullness of Ultimate Emptiness in his description of a 
conversation with a Theravada Buddhist monk:
“He had been putting before me methodically and pertinaciously argu­
ment for the Buddhist “theology of negation,” the doctrine of an- 
atman and “entire emptiness.” When he had made an end, I asked 
him, what then Nirvana itself is: and after a long pause came at last 
the single answer, low and restrained: “Bliss—unspeakable.” The 
hushed restraint of that answer, the solemnity of his voice, demeanor 
and gesture, made even more clear what was meant than the words 
themselves.”1
1 The Idea of the Holy, Oxford, 1924, p. 30.
Perhaps for Zen Buddhism the “bliss-unspeakable” phrase is too lushly 
emotional to describe satori qualities, which have more of unemotional 
clarity than suffocating emotion. Yet the essential situation is identical: 
Neither Nirvana nor satori can be described because of the all-other-sur­
passing experience-quality they represent. It is of course to this experience­
positive aspect that Suchness refers. For though a very neutral word, it does 
indicate a Somethingness, indeed The Fundamental Somethingness, which 
is encountered when one has pierced on through fear-curtained Nothing­
ness.
I would therefore suggest that the Somethingness of the ultimates in 
Buddhism is in religious actuality more central to it than the Nothingness. 
Indeed the nothingness vocabulary is primarily a device to keep Something­
ness from being too lightly, too readily esteemed and described. But as 
indicative of religious reality, of the highest possible experiential quality, 
Suchness always overcomes the Void. Theravada Buddhists tell us that 
Nirvana is bliss, not annihilation. Jodo Shinshu tells us of the mighty 
Other-Power of Amida Buddha’s eternal vow to bring all beings to en­
lightenment. Mahayana in general suggests that Nothingness produces 
somethingness, i.e., the phenomenal order. As noted, Professor Abe would 
interpret this to be a sustaining of phenomenal particularity in its integrity. 
And Dr. Suzuki has intriguingly suggested that the ancient Buddhist evil, 
tanha or the thirst for existence, is sanctified and redeemed, so to speak, by 
the ever-lasting reembodiment of Suchness (through the bodhisattvas) in 
phenomenal forms.
And now what has happened to our ultimacy-indicating categories? 
Despite a Buddhist reluctance to call them ontological, and though they 
spring out of a “merely” inner-psychic experience of timeless oneness and 
quiescence, they have, as religious expressions, become fully and centrally 
103
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
ontological. Emptiness of ideation, voidness of concept, and quiescence 
from activity, do become a Suchness of completely indeterminate character 
(in its depth). Yet Suchness, in creative grace and as its Ground of Being, 
produces and sustains a phenomenal order. Indeed, for the Enlightenment 
experience to become religious, i.e., life-transforming, it could do nothing 
less or other than to ontologically affirm such a humanly transcendent and 
blessed Reality as Suchness.
V
As has been obvious at many points in the foregoing discussion, com­
munication between Buddhist-East and Christian-West, even about religion 
is difficult at the best. In conclusion therefore it may be useful to suggest, 
as already implicitly indicated at many points, that the difficulties here center 
in four main areas, so far as Westerners are concerned.
1. Eastern use of negative terminology
For many in the West, Buddhism in particular is characterized by entire 
and pervasive negativity of language. No-self, impermanence, illusion, void, 
Nirvana—or at best a very neutral Suchness or Thatness—is all that comes 
through to the West from Buddhist statements about human-cosmic realities. 
And for the substance-minded, category-inclined, and theologically affirma­
tive West this is dubious coinage for communication; it is indeed a seeming 
non-coinage. There results an almost complete communicational impasse in 
which the East resolutely (and proudly?) draws back into its inscrutability 
surrounded by thick veils of paradox and “oriental nothingness”—to use 
the Professor Hisamatsu’s phrase; and the Western mind turns confusedly 
and scornfully away. Non-contact results. For the West there is no single 
door or easy path into Eastern Nothingness. Part of the difficulty is a matter 
of translation of key terms, and I shall propose a modest change in one such 
term a little later. Further, a look by the West into its own via negativa (in 
medieval mystical theology) would help, but this has been so thoroughly re­
jected by religious and secular West alike that it is almost as incomprehen­
sible as Eastern Nothingness. Perhaps the current decline in the simplistic 
literal dogmatism of conservative theology and some of the contemporary 
theological uncertainty may open the door to less assertive affirmations about 
the nature of ultimates; but whether the “God is dead” development re­
presents the redefinition or the total surrender of the religious remains to 
be seen. The latter result would leave nothing at all to use for coinage in 
religious intercommunication with the East. So too the increasing fluidity 
of theoretical scientific categories about the ultimate nature of scientifically 
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perceived reality may prepare a way for the West to penetrate to what 
Northrup calls the Eastern “undifferentiated esthetic continuum.”
As far as the Buddhist-Eastern “side ” is concerned it might be suggested 
(by a Westerner) that there ought to be no mere glorification of the vocabu­
lary of mysterious nothingness for its own mystifying sake. From the 
Eastern side it should perhaps be more persistently noted that the negative 
vocabulary is (1) primarily methodological only, a device for destroying 
attachment to particularity which indeed is the goal of “high” religion 
everywhere; and (2) that emptiness is also its name for Ultimate Reality. 
As J. B. Pratt observed years ago, when everything is called emptiness, then 
“emptiness” is the new name for reality.1 Buddhism is of course quite 
within its religious rights and tradition to continue to affirm the negation of 
traditional metaphysical entities, and to assert the sole reality of some kind 
of Thing-in-Itself, or Mind-in-Itself, or Suchness-in-Itself which is beyond 
all categories of description. But it is undoubtedly a Something or Somewhat 
of positive proportions.
1 The Pilgrimage of Buddhism, Macmillan, 1928, p. 240
2 John H. Walsh, “Heidegger’s Understanding of No-Thingness”, Cross- 
Currents, Summer 1963, pp. 305-323.
Therefore it would seem that in conversation with the West about 
Ultimate Reality, at least the words Suchness or Thatness should be more 
frequently used than Nothingness. And perhaps indeed the term “Nothing­
ness” is altogether an unfortunate one to indicate the Buddhist Empty- 
because-Full Reality called Suchness. I would propose a term that has been 
applied to Heidegger’s ultimate reality—No-thingness, i.e., a reality beyond 
particular specification.2
2. The Opposition of the Intuitional to the Rational-Analytic
While there are continuingly important intuitive elements in the 
Western religious and philosophical tradition, they are heavily over-laid, 
even smothered as the rule, by the prevailing rational and empirical ten­
dencies. In the East the reverse has been the case. The result is a cliche­
situation in which the Buddhist East is completely for intuition and against 
rationality, and the Christian West is dogmatically rationalistic with ab­
solutely no capacity for intuition.
For the West it is necessary that the intuitive elements of its own 
traditions be uncovered when seeking to understand the East. Not only has 
ethics had important intuitional formulations, not only do the arts necessarily 
major in the intuitional or non-conceptual, but even science is almost entirely 
dependent on the intuitional “hunch” for its significant discoveries. Indeed 
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there is even in the West a somewhat pervasive sense among intellectuals 
that Western cultures are now characterized by over-rationalism and under­
intuitionalism. And psychiatric research often bears this out in its clinical 
finding or prevalent cerebral-visceral, rational-emotional disjointedness in 
individuals, resulting in a strong sense of estrangement from one’s own true 
or real being. Such a situation accounts in part for the attractiveness of Zen 
existential integrality for some in the West. Yet some Westerners, e.g. 
Arthur Koestler and easy-Zen addicts, who have sought Eastern intuitional 
wisdom, have come away disillusioned or disoriented in a new mingled 
East-West way.
Perhaps the East does not fully recognize the depth of this division or 
the importance of analytic rationality to the West; and even may—this again 
from a Westerner—have over-estimated or partially misunderstood intuition. 
To a Westerner it seems that the East sometimes makes Intuition into a 
sacrosanct Entity, almost a god, which the Western pilgrim to Eastern 
Wisdom finds it most difficult, if not impossible, to serve as completely and 
blindly as he is often required to. Intuition is made supreme by erecting an 
impassable barrier of nearly-absolute difference of intrinsic nature between 
it and rationality. Reason is portrayed as limited, object-minded, superficial, 
clingingly attached to distinctions; intuition is considered to be unlimited, 
pure subjective consciousness, inherently penetrative, and omnipotently 
floating above all distinctions or barriers as a kind of eternal essence. As 
opposed to rationality, intuition seems sometimes to represent a deliberate 
intensification of irrationality until the intuitional essence is paradox, con­
tradiction, and non-sense. In any case it thus becomes for the Westerner an 
impenetrable mystery and a Holy Irrational Essence, as unapproachable as 
the Jewish Holy of Holies by the unclean rationalist. Is all this the self­
defensiveness of a tradition that deals more readily with the inner than the 
outer world, the Westerner asks himself?
Now few Westerners, even though convinced of the individual and 
cultural dangers of over-rationalization, are willing to consign the rational 
to inconsequence even when dealing with ultimate matters—unless they 
have come to deep personal disaster or are completely unnerved by the 
seeming meaninglessness of their own cultural life-pattern. From the 
Buddhist viewpoint this clinging to rationality may indeed represent a basic 
delusion, but for the Westerner, rationality, for all its hazards and limita­
tions, has done too much to improve human physical welfare, destroy 
superstitious fears and social tyrannies, overcome human impotence before 
natural processes, and enrich the mental and spiritual life of man, to be so 
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easily rejected. Nor can a Westerner—at least this one—escape the convic­
tion that no matter how high intuition rises above particulars and mere 
plodding intellection, it always rises from a particular basis of conceptu­
alized belief and knowledge.
Is there not some better way to relate intellect and intuition than by 
setting them at each other’s throats in deadly strife; some creative way to 
join their potencies? The danger of their continuingly unfruitful, even 
destructive separation is the greater just because each has been made to 
some extent the battle-cry of a religious-cultural party-line, as noted above.
3. The Psychological-Existential versus the Ontological-Metaphysical
Here is another aspect of the Eastern-Buddhist-favored inner, intui­
tional, idealist, immaterialist, immanent emphasis in tension with the 
Western-Christian-favored outer, rational, realist, materialist, transcendent 
emphasis in matters philosophical and religious. But all these distinctions 
relate to a common East-West religious concern of the utmost importance; 
Where is the key to the right, i.e., salvation-bringing, understanding of 
Ultimate Reality to be found?
Generally speaking—allowing for variations on both sides—the pre­
dominant Buddhist-Eastern attitude is one of distrust of the objective-outer 
in separation from the subjective-inner. Buddhism and Hinduism have 
made many analyses of the close interrelation of the two, especially of the 
dependence of objective form and ontological categories upon the inner- 
existential. (Parenthetically it may be noted that many depth-psychologists 
and existentialist philosophers in the West have also emphasized the 
existential-inner coloration of the objective world, even if not its Buddhist 
formulation.) And the East has seen the West as obsessed with the outer, 
i.e., the physical, historical, and social aspects of life, resulting in a distortive 
superficialization of human awareness and existence; in a fearful unwilling­
ness to face the basic question of self-identity at its deepest existential level; 
and in a destructive dualizing of life into an inner-outer, subject-object dicho­
tomy at every level. The East calls for the creation of a truly organic unity 
of existential-personal reality, controlled from within rather than by the 
forces of uncertain outer circumstance.
And the West? Understandably it is fearful of Eastern subjectivism. 
Where, it asks, are the landmarks of truth to be found in this vast inner 
space of shifting mood and feeling among the ghostly forms of mind-states 
and visions seen with the half-closed eyes of the meditator? How can one 
find in such twilight atmospheres the shape of meaningful reality? Indeed 
here, in sheerly inner-psychological space, what does “truth” mean—that is, 
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truth for more than one man for more than one moment? What can here 
save the hard-won rational life of man from sinking into a bottomless abyss 
of subjective fantasy and un-reason?
And so a most paradoxical situation results. The West confirms its hold 
on reality, even and especially the reality of the inner world, i.e., self, con­
sciousness, and the spiritual dimension, by a strong assertion of the reality of 
the outer objective-material world. Thus the very separation between the 
objective-outer and the subjective-inner worlds which the Buddhist deplores 
as the essence of human bondage and ignorance, is almost intrinsic to the 
Western way of asserting the reality, the uniqueness, and the importance of 
the inner world. And on the other side the East, fearful of the dangers of 
mere objectivism and its technology, when cut loose from subjective refer­
ence and mooring, denies the reality of that unique selfhood which the West 
so highly prizes as the essence of spiritual reality. It seeks to unite the 
inner-personal with the outer-objective by means of an zzwpersonal, neither- 
inner-nor-outer reality. Therefore “communication” in this area can 
scarcely be said to exist in any intelligible sense.
I do not know what the Buddhist East might wish to suggest to the 
Christian West to achieve some understanding here. But as a Westerner I 
will propose two matters of possible Buddhist-Eastern clarification. One is 
that the ontological and metaphysical assumptions and positions of Bud­
dhism should be more clearly and explicitly acknowledged by it. I realize that 
this goes against the Buddha’s warning against questions that do not tend to 
salvation, i. e., the indeterminables. But it must be borne in mind that even 
this statement took for granted certain Hindu-Buddhist metaphysical-onto­
logical doctrines, those of karma and rebirth for example. And further the 
positing of the enlightenment experience as that which gives man the central 
clue to the fundamental meaning of human life is also an ontologically 
determined and determining position. For if Enlightenment is Enlighten­
ment, all other visions of reality are partial or false. Personally therefore I 
was glad to note the very explicit statement by Professor Hiroshi Sakamoto 
in a recent book review1 that the position of Zen, as expounded by Dr. 
Suzuki, with respect to the reality of True Person and the Unconscious is 
definitely ontological rather than merely psychological.
1 The Eastern Buddhist, September 1965, p. 128.
Secondly, and correlate to this: It should be expressly admitted that 
the type of Reality which is best apprehended from the subjective-existential 
inwardness of the meditative process—even though it be termed transcen­
dent of all distinctions of inner-outer, subjective-objective nature—is appre­
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hended from the gateway of inner subjectivity. While the Buddhist East 
may not wish to use the Western philosophical term “idealism” with regard 
to this mode of apprehension and the ontology which ensues, it would be in 
the interests of all-around clarity and further inter-communication if at least 
the idealistic context and take-off point of this insight were acknowledged.
4. Self and Not-Self
No Western-Christian, Eastern-Buddhist discussion can long avoid a 
consideration of self. And in a real sense it is the prime focal point of all 
Buddhist-Christian discussions. As might be expected, here too stereotyped 
formulae for discussion have developed. Crudely stated the West hopes to 
save its individual selfhood unto all eternity; and the East sees in the des­
truction of that very selfhood the only door to salvation. The result of such 
stereotyped discussion is a dead-end prededicated to non-communication. 
But the matter of self and its destruction or preservation is by no means so 
simple as this. As Herbert Fingarette1 has noted the world “self” actually 
is a whole family of confused meanings. Further, both Eastern meditation 
masters and such Western psychoanalysts as Freud and Jung have observed 
the many-leveled operation which the human psyche represents in its func­
tional actuality. Thus much discussion of the meaning and existence (or 
non-existence) of “self” has been confused by the failure to carefully specify 
the context in which the discussion takes place, by absolutizing one context 
or level of selfhood as total self, or by unconsciously shifting from one context 
to another while continuing to use the same word “self.”
1 The Self in Transformation, Harper and Row (Torchbook 1177), 1963, 
Chapter 7.
2 Op. cit. p. 311 ff.
Needless to say a few final paragraphs will not bring complete illumi­
nation to this complicated matter, but the following suggestions seem perti­
nent : A basic clarification might be found in the fact that the Christian- 
Western view of self-hood has been predominantly conceptual and the 
Buddhist-Eastern existential. For the West, therefore, selfhood has become 
a tightly-packaged individuality which is to be sharply separated from, and 
protected against, all invasions of the impersonal or non-personal. Hence it 
has strongly emphasized specific self-consciousness, i.e., the consciousness of 
the personal self as separate from other selves and from things, and tended 
to identify this self with what Fingarette calls the “anxiety-generated” 
subjectivity, that subjectivity resulting from intra-psychic conflict ;2 or we 
might call it the self of consciousness-in-emotional-tension-with-its-existential- 
situation. The West has also tended to soften the call of its own predominant 
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faith (Christianity) to “self-denial,” or to give such denial narrow and ob­
vious forms; and above all to fearfully reject the mystic witness and call to 
the achievement of an zozself conscioussness or impersonal awareness.
The Buddhist pattern in contrast has been to abjure all conceptual 
selfhood whatsoever as intrinsically evil, and to glory in its precise opposite 
■—the destruction of the sense of self-hood, the denial of the reality of the 
self, the illusory quality of self-consciousness, and so on. And it has accorded 
full support to the mystic witness to a final and complete awareness of Non­
self,1 or what may be the same thing, a seemingly non-personal awareness. 
But we may ask, which self (or self in what context) does Buddhism desire 
to rid humanity of? For the non-self language of Buddhism should not blind 
anyone, either non-Buddhist or Buddhist, to overwhelming existential vita­
lity of some sort of selfness in Buddhism. For the discovery that one is a 
“non-self” by no means emasculates or paralyzes the active mental-physical 
entity of an enlightened non-self, say a Zen roshi for example. Quite the 
contrary as a matter of fact. Indeed throughout the Buddhist spiritual 
discipline in all its varieties and history, a persistent feature strikes the at­
tention: The increasingly “non-selfed” or “de-selfed” self acts increasingly 
like what the West has sought to designate by its terms autonomous, inte­
grated, liberated, spontaneous, enlarged, or redeemed self, i.e., the achieve­
ment of genuine self-controlled, acting-from-within selfhood—though it may 
be argued, that Buddhism achieves a deeper level of subjective spontaneity 
and integration. In any case, so dominant is the actuality of the Existential 
Self as goal and criterion of religious living for the East that paradoxically 
the Christian West has often charged Buddhism with complete submersion 
in egoism, with the magnification of the Self to deity-status 1
1 Cf. Mysticism and Philosophy, W. T. Stace, J. B. Lippincott, 1960, pp. 111- 
122 and Chapter VI.
What then can be done here? Somewhat less of uncritical waving of 
party banners (Self against No-Self) in simple language-bound literal minded­
ness is certainly called for. Especially there should be some further serious 
attempts, including psychological experimentation and philosophical analysis 
as well as interchange of religious experiences, to penetrate both the meaning 
and experiential basis of such words as “subjective” and “objective,” “per­
sonal” and “impersonal,” “self” and “non-self” that cluster about all 
Buddhist-East, Christian-West discussions. Such open-minded discussion 
would hopefully prevent the indicative word-symbols of diverse religious 
experiences from hardening further into completely impassable barriers to 
authentic religious inter-communication.
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